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OVERRULING ROE v. WADE: AN ANALYSIS OF
THE PROPOSED CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS*
CHARLES E. RiCE**
It is a great pleasure for me to participate in this special issue
honoring Professor John D. O'Reilly and Professor Richard S. Sullivan. The impact of a law teacher is often not apparent to his
students until their later years in the profession. While I was attending Boston College Law School, my appreciation of Professors
O'Reilly and Sullivan was substantial and genuine. But it is only in
later years that I have come to appreciate fully the real education
they provided. Their insights went beyond the mere technical
analysis of cases, though both of them made such analyses
thoroughly and well. Rather, we gained from these gentlemen an
appreciation of the deeper issues of fairness and morality that underlie current questions of public law. The ethical concerns imparted in
the O'Reilly and Sullivan courses, especially in Constitutional Law
and Labor Law, have been and are an enduring element of my own
professional outlook. I do not mean an identity of view on particular
issues. For the O'Reilly and Sullivan courses underlined the fact that
there are few questions in public law that are not subject to reasonable and legitimate variance of views. Rather, I refer to their inculcation of a spirit of inquiry and their respect for the fact that there
are elements of justice and morality that cannot be ignored in any
sound approach to public law.
As a contribution to this special issue, I venture to offer some
comments on the most critical constitutional issue ever faced by the
American people. Very few issues of public law are so clear as to be
beyond legitimate debate. One of these, in my opinion, is abortion,
which involves the unjustifiable killing of innocent human beings.
In any society that has not taken leave of its senses, it is beyond
question that innocent human beings should not be defined as nonpersons and subjected to death at the convenience of others. Unfortunately, the current state of our law on this point is a measure of
our degradation. On January 22, 1973, the Supreme Court of the
United States, in Roe v. Wade,' held that the child in the womb is
* The thesis advanced here is an elaboration on that originally presented in an article by
the author entitled "The Dred Sott Case of the Twentieth Century," which was published in
10 Houston Law Review 1054 (1973). The basic analysis contained in the earlier article is
presented here for the benefit of the reader.
-- A.B., College of the Holy Cross, 1953; LL.B., Boston College Law School, 1956;
LL.M., New York University School of Law, 1959; S.J.D., New York University School of
Law, 1962; Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School.
1 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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not a "person" within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment,
which provides: "No State shall . . . deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
' 2
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Having decided that the child in the womb is not a "person," the
Court then held that the mother's right to privacy prevents the state
from prohibiting abortion except in very limited situations, and
went on to invalidate Texas statutes which prohibited abortion
except when "procured or attempted by medical advice for the
purpose of saving the life of the mother."'3 In the companion case,
Doe v. Bolton, 4 the Court struck down Georgia statutes, patterned
after the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code, which prohibited abortion unless "performed by a physician duly licensed" in
Georgia when
based upon his best clinical judgment . . . an abortion is
necessary because:
(1) A continuation of the pregnancy would endanger
the life of the pregnant woman or would seriously and
permanently injure her health; or
(2) The fetus would very likely be born with a grave,
permanent, and irremediable mental or physical defect; or
(3) The pregnancy resulted from forcible or statutory
rape.5
At the time of the Supreme Court rulings, fourteen other states had
statutes similar to the Georgia provisions and thirty other states
had
6
more restrictive prohibitions comparable to the Texas laws.
In Wade the Supreme Court held that the mother's right of
privacy, whether it
be founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of
personal liberty and restrictions upon state action, as we
feel it is, or, as the District Court determined, in the Ninth
Amendment's reservation of rights to the people, is broad
enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to
7
terminate her pregnancy.
The Court went on to indicate, however, that the right of privacy
"is not absolute and is subject to some limitations; and that at some
point the state interests as to protection of health, medical stan2

U.S. Const. amend. 14, § 1. See 410 U.S. at 157-58.

3 Tex. Pen. Code Ann. arts. 1191-94, 1196 (1952). See 410 U.S. at 117-18, 152-55.
4 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
s Ga. Code Ann. § 26-1202
6

(1972).
See enumeration in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 140.

7

Id. at 153.
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dards, and prenatal life, become dominant."' 8 But state regulation of
abortion may be justified only by a "compelling state interest."9 The
Court rejected the contention advanced by the State of Texas that
the compelling state interest attaches here "from and after
conception. "' 1 Rather, "[w]ith respect to the State's important and
legitimate interest in the health of the mother, the 'compelling'
point, in the light of present medical knowledge, is at approximately
the end of the first trimester. '" Prior to the end of the first trimester, the state may neither prohibit nor regulate abortion, which
"must be left to the medical judgment of the pregnant woman's
attending physician. ' 12 From the end of the first three months to
viability, the state may not prohibit abortion but may "regulate the
abortion procedure in ways that are reasonably related to maternal
health. ' 13 Of course, at any stage, the state may proscribe any
abortion by a person who is not "a physician currently licensed by
' 14
the State."
The state's interest in "potential life" does not become compelling enough to justify any prohibition of abortion until viability.
"Viability is usually placed at about seven months (28 weeks) but
may occur earlier, even at 24 weeks."' 5 "For the stage subsequent to
viability," the state may regulate and even forbid abortion "except
where it is necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the
preservation of the life or health of the mother."'1 6 The health of the
mother, said the Court in Bolton, includes "psychological as well as
physical well-being"'17 and "the medical judgment may be exercised
in the light of all factors-physical, emotional, psychological, familial, and the woman's age-relevant to the well-being"' s of the
mother. The mental health of the mother is such an elastic ground
for abortion' 9 that the Supreme Court decisions effectively permit
elective abortion right up until the time of normal delivery.
In the abortion cases, the Supreme Court said: "We need not
resolve the difficult question of when life begins. ' 20 The Court
endorsed "the view that the fetus, at most, represents only the
O

Id. at 155.

9Id.
10 Id. at 156.

t1Id.at 163.
12 Id.
13 Id.
t4 Id. at 165.

I- Id.at 160.
16 Id. at 164.

17 410 U.S. at 191-92.
18 Id. at 192.

19 See Ford, Mass-produced, Assembly-line Abortion, California Medicine 117 (Nov.
1972).
20 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 159.
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potentiality of life." 2 1 Without considering or deciding the question
of whether or not the child in the womb is a human being, the Court
held that he is not a "person" within the meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The Court said that "the word 'person,' as used in the
Fourteenth Amendment, does not include the unborn. ' 22 It could be
argued that the Court's ruling in this respect left the door open to
Congress to define the child in the womb as a "person" pursuant to
the congressional power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment by
appropriate legislation. It is more likely, however, that the Court
regarded the child in the womb as inherently incapable of being
considered a Fourteenth Amendment "person" absent a constitutional amendment to that effect.
It is not my purpose here to criticize the abortion decisions in
detail. Professor Robert M. Byrn has exposed the many specific
23
errors and evasions found in the majority opinions in those cases.
As Professor Byrn demonstrates, the Supreme Court's opinions in
Wade and Bolton are an intellectual shambles. I will not try to cover
the same detailed ground that Professor Byrn did. Rather, after
examining the medical evidence which establishes that the unborn
child is a human being from the moment of conception, this article
will evaluate the propriety of excluding this class of human beings
from the protections of the Fourteenth Amendment. Thereafter, the
jurisprudential significance of the underlying theory of the
decisions-the theory that an innocent human being can be legitimately defined as a non-person and subjected to death at the discretion of others-will be analyzed. Finally, possible remedies for the
decisions will be discussed.
I.

FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT "PERSONHOOD"

OF THE UNBORN

CHILD

A.

The Unborn Child as Human Being

Without deciding whether or not a child in the womb is a
human being, the Court in Wade and Bolton determined that he is a
non-person and that he can be killed, therefore, at the discretion of
others. In so acting, the Court failed to give the benefit of the doubt
to life, i.e., to personhood. If the justices regarded the matter as
doubtful, they ought at least to have followed the general tendency
of our law and tradition to give the benefit of the doubt to innocent
21

Id. at 162.

22

Id. at 158.

' Byrn, An American Tragedy- The Supreme Court on Abortion, 41 Fordham L. Rev.
807 (1973).
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life.2 4 Unfortunately, in ruling that the child in the womb is a
non-person without stopping to consider whether or not he is a
human being, the Court acted like the hunter who sees movement in
the undergrowth and shoots in reckless disregard of whether it is a
man or a deer causing the movement. Moreover, the Court's decisions are as indefensible as if the Court had explicitly found the
unborn child to be a human being and then had defined him as a
non-person, for the Court in effect held that he is a non-person
whether or not he is human. For all the Court knows, therefore, he
is human. The decisions have the same jurisprudential character as
if the Court had defined an acknowledged human being as a nonperson.
There can be no basis for doubting that the unborn child is a
living human being and is so from the moment the father's sperm
combines with the mother's ovum. Dr. Bradley Patten of the University of Michigan Medical School spelled this out in his basic text
on human embryology:
Every one of the higher animals starts life as a single
cell-the fertilized ovum. This fertilized ovum, as its technical name zygote implies, has a dual origin. It is formed
by the fusion of a germ cell from the male parent with one
from the female parent. The union of two such sex cells to
form a zygote constitutes the process of fertilization and
initiates the life of a new individual.
. . . The reproductive cells which unite to initiate the
development of a new individualare known as gametes...
the small, actively motile gametes from the male being
called spermatozoa or spermia, and the larger, food-laden
gametes formed within the female being termed ova....
. . . The growth and maturation of the sex cells, the
liberation of the ovum, and the transportation of the sperm
are all factors leading toward the actual union of the gametes. It is the penetration of the ovum by a spermatozoon
and the resultant mingling of the chromosomal material
each brings to the union that culminates the process of
fertilization and initiates the life of a new individual.2
24 The most notable instance of this benefit of the doubt is the "presumption of innocence" in criminal law, under which "the prosecution must prove, beyond a reasonable doubt,
all the elements of the crime charged" before a defendant can be subjected to fine or
imprisonment. W. LaFave & A. Scott, Criminal Law 52 (1972). This benefit of the doubt
applies to all crimes, including capital crimes where execution is the penalty.
2s B. Patten, Foundations of Embryology 3, 35, 82 (1964) (emphasis added).
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Fertilization, according to Dr. Patten, begins "a new individual
life history."'2 6 Thereafter, the process of development is one of
growth, and "birth is but a convenient landmark in a continuing
process. ' 27 Twenty years ago, a New York court commented as
follows upon these simple facts of life:
The mother's biological contribution from conception on is
nourishment and protection; but the fetus has become a
separate organism and remains so throughout its life. That
it may not live if its protection and nourishment are cut off
earlier than the viable stage of its development is not to
destroy its separability; it is rather to describe the conditions under which life will not continue. Succeeding conditions exist, of course, that have that result
at every stage of
28
its life, postnatal as well as prenatal.
Paul E. Rockwell, M.D., Director of Anesthesiology at Leonard
Hospital, Troy, New York, described his own encounter with the
unborn child:
Eleven years ago while giving an anesthetic for a
ruptured ectopic pregnancy (at two months gestation) I was
handed what I believe was the smallest living human being
ever seen. The embryo sac was intact and transparent.
Within the sac was a tiny (approx. 1 cm.) human male
swimming extremely vigorously in the amniotic fluid, while
attached to the wall by the umbilical cord. This tiny
human was perfectly developed, with long, tapering
fingers, feet and toes. It was almost transparent, as regards
the skin, and the delicate arteries and veins were prominent to the ends of the fingers.
The baby was extremely alive and swam about the sac
approximately one time per second, with a natural
swimmer's stroke. This tiny human did not look at all like
the photos and drawings and models of "embryos" which I
have seen, nor did it look like a few embryos I have been
able to observe since then, obviously because this one was
alive!
* * ' When the sac was opened, the tiny human immediately lost its life and took on the appearance of what is
accepted as the appearance of an embryo at this age (blunt
extremities, etc.).
Id. at 79.
Id. at 3.
28 Kelly v. Gregory, 282 App. Div. 542, 544, 125 N.Y.S.2d 696, 697 (1953).
26
27
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...It is my opinion that if the lawmakers and people
realized that very vigorous life is present, it is possible that
abortion would
be found much more objectionable than
29
euthanasia.
Without belaboring the point, it is abundantly clear that the
Planned Parenthood Association was correct when it admitted the
simple fact in a 1963 pamphlet, before that group began to advocate
abortion, that:
An abortion requires an operation. It kills the life of a baby
after it has begun. It is dangerous to your life and health.
It may make you sterile so that when you want a child you
cannot have it. Birth control merely postpones the begin30
ning of life.
B.

The Unborn Child as Person

Taking it as an established fact that the unborn child is a
human being, why, it may be asked, is it wrong to define him as a
non-person? In the 1857 Dred Scott case, 31 the Supreme Court held
that a free Negro, descended from slaves, could not become a
"citizen" of the United States. 32 The Court in Dred Scott appeared
to regard slaves as so inferior that as to them, and apparently to
some extent freed Negroes as well, "the general terms used in the
Constitution of the United States, as to the rights of man and the
rights of the people," were not intended to "include them, or to give
to them or their posterity the benefit of any of its provisions. '3 3 The
inferior constitutional position of slaves resulted from specific provisions of the Constitution which treated slaves as property by forbidding Congress to prohibit the importation of slaves before 180834
and by requiring states to which any slaves should escape to redeliver them to their masters. 35 There are, of course, no such specific
restrictions directed by the Constitution, including the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments, against the child in the womb so as to
deprive him of personhood and therefore the right to live. Absent
29

Albany Times Union, March 10, 1970, at 17, col. 3, cited in Byrn, Abortion-on-

Demand: Whose Morality?, 46 Notre Dame Law. 5, 8-9 (1970).
30 See Ratner, Is It a Person or a Thing?, Report 20, 22 (April 1966).
31 Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
32 The Court's holding was subsequently rendered nugatory by the Fourteenth Amendment, which provides that: "All persons born or naturalized in the United States . . .are
citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside." U.S. Const. amend. 14, §
1.
33 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 409.

34 U.S. Const. art. I, § 9.
3s U.S. Const. art IV, § 2.
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such provisions, there is no constitutional basis for the denial to the
unborn child of this right.
The 1973 abortion decisions did the same thing to the child in
the womb that the Dred Scott case did to the slaves. Where the right
to life or liberty depends on the existence of personhood, it violates
elementary natural justice to deny that status to certain classes of
human beings while granting it to all others.
It was the general intent of the framers of both the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments to treat all human beings as persons and
therefore as falling within the protections of those amendments.
Congressman John Bingham, who sponsored the Fourteenth
Amendment in the House of Representatives, described it as having
universal application and noted that it pertained to "any human
being."'36 Senator Allen A. Thurman, in commenting on the scope of
.the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, stated
that
[It] covers every human being within the jurisdiction of a
state. It was intended to shield the foreigner, to shield the
wayfarer, to shield the Indian, the Chinaman, every
any
human being within the jurisdiction of a State 3from
v
deprivation of an equal protection of the laws.
With respect to the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment, the
Supreme Court in Ex parte Milligan38 stated that: "The Constitution
of the United States is a law for rulers and people, equally in war
and in peace, and covers with the shield of its protection all classes
of men, at all times, and under all circumstances."3 9 In that same
opinion, declaring unconstitutional the Civil War suspension of the
writ of habeas corpus, the Court said: "By the protection of the law
human rights are secured; withdraw that protection, and they are '40at
the mercy of wicked rulers, or the clamor of an excited people."
Although it does not appear that the framers of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments specifically considered the status of the
child in the womb, we can legitimately infer their intent to protect
the unborn child from their more general intent to include all human
beings as persons. This is especially so since we know today, as the
framers of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments did not clearly
know, that the unborn child is a human being. Moreover, even if it
could be said that the framers did consider the point and intended to
Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1089 (1866).
3 Cong. Rec. 1794 (1875) (emphasis added). See generally A. Avins, The Reconstruction Amendment Debates 12, 29, 36, 220-21, 274, 460, 556, 558, 565, 622, 631, 708, 733,
737-38, 740-42 (1967).
38 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
39 Id. at 120-21 (emphasis added).
40 Id. at 119 (emphasis added).
36

37
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regard the unborn child as a non-person on the belief that he was
not a human being, 4 1 such an intention should not control today
because it would have been based on an outmoded and erroneous
factual assumption-namely, that the child in the womb is not a
human being. For this reason the framers' general intent to regard
42
all human beings as persons should control.
More recently, the Supreme Court considered the scope of the
Fourteenth Amendment and formulated criteria for personhood encompassing all living human beings. Addressing itself to the rights
of illegitimate children, the Court in Levy v. Louisiana43 said: "We
start from the premise that illegitimate children are not 'nonpersons.'
They are humans, live, and have their being. They are clearly
of the Equal Protection Clause of the
'persons' within the meaning
44
Fourteenth Amendment."
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court in Wade and Bolton did not
even discuss the criteria for personhood enunciated in the Levy case.
Under the Levy standard, the child in the womb is clearly a person,
for he is human, he lives and has his being. 45 In other words, all

living human beings are persons. Nor can it be argued that somehow the unborn child, though alive, is less than human. As the
living issue of human parents, what else can he be but human? He is
not a giraffe or a turnip or a toad.
It is significant, too, that the Supreme Court's denial of personhood to the unborn child runs counter to the general development of
the law in this century. In the fields of property, torts and equity,
the courts have increasingly harmonized the law with the advancing
scientific knowledge of life before birth. 4 6 Almost thirty years ago, a
41 Research has failed to uncover any evidence to this effect.
42 Although the Fourteenth Amendment does not specifically mention corporations, it is

well settled that corporations have the rights of persons within the meaning of that amendment. See discussion in County of Santa Clara v. Southern Pac. R.R., 18 F. 385, 396-99 (D.
Cal. 1883), aff'd, 118 U.S. 394 (1886). See also Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233,
244 (1936). While it appears that at least some of the framers had corporations in mind when
they used the word "person" in the Fourteenth Amendment, there is no clear indication of a
general intent to include corporations as persons. See Graham, The Conspiracy Theory of the
Fourteenth Amendment, 47 Yale L.J. 371 (1938). Nevertheless, corporations are treated as
persons. The intent of the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment to include all human beings
as persons is far more explicit and clear than their intent to include corporations. Therefore,
once it is shown that the unborn child is a human being he should be considered a "person"
within the Fourteenth Amendment sense of the word.
43 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
44 Id. at 70 (emphasis added).
45 Although the Levy case dealt with the rights of afterborn illegitimate children, it
cannot be gainsaid that the standard actually set down by the Supreme Court applies as well
to unborn children. For a more detailed discussion of this point, see Byrn, An American
Tragedy. The Supreme Court on Abortion, 41 Fordharn L. Rev. 807, 842-43 (1973).
46 See Note, The Law and the Unborn Child: The Legal and Logical Inconsistencies, 46
Notre Dame Law. 349 (1971).
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federal court noted that: "From the viewpoint of the civil law and
the law of property, a child en ventre sa mere is not only regarded as
[a] human being, but as such from the moment of
conception-which it is in fact."'47 Dean William L. Prosser summarized the status of the unborn child in the law of torts:
So far as duty is concerned, if existence at the time is
necessary, medical authority has recognized long since that
the child is in existence from the moment of conception,
and for many purposes its existence is recognized by the
law. The criminal law regards it as a separate entity, and
the law of property considers it in being for all purposes
which are to its benefit, such as taking by will or descent.
After its birth, it has been held that it may maintain a
statutory action for the wrongful death of the parent. So
far as causation is concerned, there will certainly be cases
in which there are difficulties of proof, but they are no
more frequent, and the difficulties, are no greater, than as
to many other medical problems. All writers who have
discussed the problem have joined in condemning the old
rule, in maintaining that the unborn child in the path of an
automobile is as much a person in the street as the mother,
and in urging that recovery should be allowed upon proper
48

proof.

Interestingly, a majority of courts now hold that even the
parents of a stillborn child may maintain a wrongful death action
where the child's death was caused by prenatal injury. 4 9 In equity
cases, too, the law has protected the rights of the unborn child. In
Raleigh Fitkin-PaulMorgan Memorial Hospital v. Anderson,50 the
New Jersey Supreme Court compelled a mother to undergo a blood
transfusion to save the life of her unborn child, even though the
transfusion was contrary to her religious beliefs:
47 Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138, 140 (D.D.C. 1946).
41 W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts 336 (4th ed. 1971) (footnotes omitted).
49 In the following cases the courts found that an unborn infant who receives injury and

as a result thereof is stillborn is a "person" within the meaning of the state's wrongful death
statute: Kwaterski v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 34 Wis. 2d 14, 148 N.W.2d 107 (1967);
State ex rel. Odham v. Sherman, 234 Md. 179, 198 A.2d 71 (1964); Gorke v. Le Clerc, 23
Conn. Supp. 256, 181 A.2d 448 (1962); Hale v. Manion, 189 Kan. 143, 368 P.2d 1 (1962);
Stidam v. Ashmore, 109 Ohio App. 431, 167 N.E.2d 106 (1959); Poliquin v. MacDonald, 101
N.H. 104, 135 A.2d 249 (1957); Mitchell v. Couch, 285 S.W.2d 901 (Ky. 1955); Rainy v.
Horn, 221 Miss. 269, 72 So. 2d 434 (1954). Contra, Durrett v. Owens, 212 Tenn. 614, 371
S.W.2d 433 (1963); Daley v. Meier, 33 Ill.
App. 2d 218, 178 N.E.2d 691 (1961); La Blue v.
Specker, 358 Mich. 558, 100 N.W.2d 445 (1960).
50 42 N.J. 421, 201 A.2d 537, cert. denied, 377 U.S. 985 (1964).

ROE v. WADE

We are satisfied that the unborn child is entitled to the
law's protection and that an appropriate order should be
made to insure blood transfusions to the mother in the
event that they are necessary in the opinion of the physician in charge at the time. s
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court in Wade and Bolton defined the
child in the womb as a non-person and thus in effect permitted his
right to live to be outweighed by his mother's right of privacy. It
should be clear that the right of privacy of one human being should
not be protected from infringement at the expense of the life of
another, innocent human being.
In sum, it is clear that legal authority, neglected by the Court in
the abortion decisions, points toward treatment of the unborn child
as a person. The abortion decisions thus constitute a denial of
constitutional protections to a class of persons-a morally repugnant
and precedentially dangerous result.
II.

THE SIGNIFICANCE AND POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE
Wade AND Bolton DECISIONS

In the wake of the Supreme Court abortion decisions, efforts
are being made to change the law so as to allow active euthanasia
and also passive euthanasia through the withholding from patients
of clearly ordinary treatments. S2 This should not be surprising, for
the Supreme Court rulings do not involve abortion alone. Rather,
they rest upon a whole new philosophy of life. If some human beings
can be defined as non-persons because they are too young, that is,
because they have not lived nine months from their conception,
others can be so defined because they are too old, because they are
retarded, or because they have other similar disabilities.
The Supreme Court was strangely silent about the jurisprudential validity of a decree depriving an innocent human being of
personhood and the right to live. In 1972, the New York Court of
Appeals did discuss that issue in a case sustaining the permissive
New York abortion law against the objection that the child in the
womb is a person and that the statute therefore violated his constitutional rights.5 3 The New York court specifically found that the
51 Id. at 423, 201 A.2d at 538.
52 See San Francisco Examiner, Jan. 26, 1973, at 18, col. 1; Williams, Number, Types

and Duration of Human Lives, 493, 496 Northwest Medicine (July 1970); Comment,
Euthanasia: Criminal, Tort, Constitutional and Legislative Considerations, 48 Notre Dame
Law. 1202 (1973).
53 Byrn v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 31 N.Y.2d 194, 286 N.E.2d 887, 335
N.Y.S.2d 390 (1972).
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unborn child is in fact human and that he is "unquestionably
alive."'5 4 But then the court went on to conclude that the legislature
may legitimately deprive that innocent human being of personhood:
What is a legal .person is for the law, including, of course,
the Constitution, to say, which simply means that upon
according legal personality to a thing the law affords it the
rights and privileges of a legal person (e.g., Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State, pp. 93-109. ....
55
The c6ntrolling philosophy here can be seen in the New York
court's reliance on Hans Kelsen as authority for its conclusions. As
one analyst has put it, Kelsen's "pure" theory of law is
perhaps the most consistent expression of analytical
positivism in legal theory. For it is characteristic of legal
positivism that it contemplates the form of law rather than
its moral or social contents, that it confines itself to the
investigation of the law as it is, without regard to its
justness or unjustness, and that it attempts to free legal
theory completely from all qualifications or value
judg56
ments -of a political, social, or economic nature.
Kelsen regards the "legal person" as "the subject of legal duties and
legal rights."'5 7 In Kelsen's view, the law does not have to regard all
human beings as persons and a law would be no less valid because it
excluded some innocent human beings from the category of persons.
Law, in Kelsen's view, is a form into which contents of any
kind may be put, according to the prevailing social views.
The content of law may be changed every day by those to
whom lawmaking power has been entrusted. The possibility of natural law is categorically denied by Kelsen.5 8
Another commentator sees Kelsen's " 'pure theory of law' [as] sheer
positivism, excluding from the domain of jurisprudence the 'irra-

tional' idea of justice as mere emotion." 5 9
We have established in our law, as of January 22, 1973, the
principle that some innocent human beings can be defined as nonpersons and thereby deprived of the right to live. So far the child in
the womb is the only victim. But it is predictable that the principle
S4 Id. at 199, 286 N.E.2d at 888, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 392.

ss Id. at 201, 286 N.E.2d at 889, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 393.
56 E. Bodenheimer, Jurisprudence 285 (1940).
57 H. Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State 93 (1946).
58 E. Bodenheimer, Jurisprudence 285 (1940).
59 C. Wu, Fountain of Justice 42 (1955).
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will be extended as well to the retarded, the senile and other target
classes. The Supreme Court described "viability" as "the capability
of meaningful life outside the mother's womb. '60 If viability requires
capacity for "meaningful" life, what about the retarded, the sick and
the senile? And who is to decide what is "meaningful"? "There is the
well-known fact," wrote Hannah Arendt,
that Hitler began his mass murders by granting "mercy
deaths" to the "incurably ill," and that he intended to wind
up his extermination program by doing away with "genetically damaged" Germans (heart and lung patients). But
quite aside from that, it is apparent that this sort of killing
can be directed against any given group, that is, that the
principle of selection is dependent only upon circumstantial
factors. It is quite conceivable that in the automated
economy of a not-too-distant future men may be tempted
to exterminate all those
whose intelligence quotient is
61
below a certain level.

Under the Nuremberg Laws of 1935, the Nazis deprived Jews
of their citizenship and political rights. 62 Later they were deprived
of their lives as well, pursuant to a "euthanasia?' program designed
to achieve "the destruction of life devoid of value. ' 63 Permissive
abortion inflicts upon the child in the womb the same inequality that
the Nazis inflicted on the Jews; that is, the victim in both cases is
subjected to death where other human beings are not, because the
victim is regarded as a "life devoid of value." This analogy becomes
even stronger when one considers the procedures now available to
the medical community. The process of amniocentesis, whereby a
quantity of amniotic fluid is extracted and analyzed for certain
genetic defects, e.g., Down's Syndrome (mongoloidism), is being
continuously improved as to the number of defects which can be
recognized while the child is still in the womb. It would be possible
to combine systematic testing of unborn children for genetic defects
with systematic abortion of all those with a probability of being born
genetically defective, thus exterminating "undesirables" before they
are even born. The only significant difference between abortion and
euthanasia is the age and location of the victim. Under the governing jurisprudence of analytical positivism, the decision to kill in
either case will be entirely unimpeded by "irrational" considerations
of justice.
60
61

62
63

Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 163.
H. Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem 288-89 (1965).

See H. Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem 39 (1954).
F. Wertham, A Sign for Cain 153 (1969).
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III.

POSSIBLE REMEDIAL ANSWERS TO THE
AND

A.

Bolton

Wade

DECISIONS

Federal Legislation

Abortion, then, is a big problem. But one has to be careful in
trying to solve it. There are several possible remedies. One is for
Congress to exercise its power to enforce the Fourteenth and Fifth
Amendments by simply defining the child in the womb as a person
at least insofar as his right to live is concerned. However, it is
doubtful that such a definition would survive the scrutiny of the
Supreme Court, since it is likely that the Wade and Bolton decisions
mean that, in the Court's view, the unborn child is inherently
incapable of being considered a person in the absence of a constitu64
tional amendment.
Another possible remedy arises from the power of Congress,
under Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution, to withdraw the
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, and the trial and appellate jurisdiction of lower federal courts, in cases involving abortion
laws. 65 But this remedy, while desirable, would be only partial. A
withdrawal of abortion cases from the jurisdiction of federal courts
would leave the state courts free to handle such cases, and it would
not invalidate the abortion decisions of the Supreme Court. At least
some state courts and legislatures would consider themselves bound
by the Supreme Court precedents and others could possibly arrive at
the same conclusion on their own initiative. The withdrawal of
abortion cases from the jurisdiction of the federal courts would
therefore not be adequate to stop abortions.
B.

State Legislation

Nor can abortions be effectively curtailed by enacting state laws
restricting abortion within the confines of the Supreme Court rulings. The Supreme Court has left little or no room for the states to
prevent abortions at any stage of the pregnancy. The most the states
can do, within the framework of the Court's rulings, is to make it
inconvenient to get abortions. Generally, this will be a waste of time
and a diversion of effort from the needed constitutional amendment.
It is desirable, however, to enact "conscience" protections, ensuring
that no mother will be forced to undergo an abortion and no doctor,
nurse or hospital will be forced to perform or provide facilities for
abortions. Public Law 93-45, enacted by Congress on June 18, 1973,
See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 158-59.
See Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869); Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.)
440 (1850). See also Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 101 (1970).
320
6

65

ROE v. WADE

provides that no entity receiving certain types of federal medical
subsidies may
(1) discriminate in the employment, promotion, or
termination of employment of any physician or other
health care personnel, or
(2) discriminate in the extension of staff or other
privileges to any physician or other health care
personnel, because he performed or assisted in the performance of a lawful sterilization procedure or abortion, because he refused to perform or assist in the performance of
such a procedure or abortion on the grounds that his performance or assistance in the performance of the procedure
or abortion would be contrary to his religious beliefs or
moral convictions, or because of his religious beliefs or
respecting sterilization procedures or
moral convictions
66
abortions.
It should be noted that this provision protects not only the
doctor or nurse who refuses to perform abortions but also the one
who does perform them. A Catholic hospital receiving federal funds,
for example, is therefore forbidden to deny or suspend staff
privileges of a doctor who performs abortions off the premises of
that hospital.
C.

ConstitutionalAmendments

The essential remedy to the abortion problem is a consitutional
amendment. There are two basic types that could be enacted to deal
with abortion. One is the permissive or "states' rights" amendment
that would allow each state to make its own decision whether to
permit or forbid abortions. The other is the prohibitory sort of
amendment that would actually forbid abortions.
1. A "States' Rights" Amendment
A permissive or "states' rights" amendment has been introduced
in the House of Representatives by Representative Whitehurst
(R.-Va.). Its operative language provides:
Section 1. Nothing in this Constitution shall bar any State
or territory or the District of Columbia, with regard to any
area over which it has jurisdiction, from allowing, regulat67
ing or prohibiting the practice of abortion.
There are two objections to this type of amendment. First, it
66
67

Pub. L. No. 93-45, § 401(c) (June 18, 1973) (emphasis added).
H.R.J. Res. 427, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
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could be argued that the amendment would not require state courts
to uphold state statutes prohibiting abortions. The Whitehurst
amendment merely makes it constitutional, under the United States
Constitution, for the states to allow, regulate or prohibit abortion.
The. amendment does not overrule the Supreme Court's abortion
decisions, nor does it confer personhood on the child in the womb,
nor does it affect the state courts' interpretations of the due process
and equal protection clauses in state constitutions. All states have
such due process and equal protection clauses in one form or
another, and they are generally assumed to correspond in meaning
to the similar clauses in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to
the United States Constitution. In construing those clauses, the state
courts could regard the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United
States as determinative, including the Wade and Bolton rulings that
the unborn child is a non-person. The state courts could conceivably
invalidate state prohibitions against abortion, even after adoption of
the Whitehurst amendment, on the ground that such laws violate
the mother's right to privacy which is protected by the due process
clause of the state constitution.
The second objection to the Whitehurst amendment is one of
principle. Abortion is wrong because it violates the unborn child's
basic right to live. It is wrong for the Supreme Court to deny that
right. But it would also be indefensible to condition that right on the
concurrence of the legislature in each state. That would be similar to
contending that each locality in Germany during World War II
should have been allowed to decide whether or not to have a death
camp to exterminate undesirables. It would constitutionalize the
mass murder of millions.
2. Prohibitory Amendments
The second type of constitutional amendment is one that would
prohibit abortion rather than leave the decision up to the states.
This is the preferable approach. There are two major amendments
of this type pending in Congress. One, introduced by Congressman
Lawrence J. Hogan (R.-Md.), provides:
Section 1. Neither the United States nor any State shall
deprive any human being, from the moment of conception,
of life without due process of law; nor deny to any human
being, from the moment of conception, within its jurisdiction, the equal protection of the laws.
Section 2. Neither the United States nor any State shall
deprive any human being of life on account of illness, age
or incapacity.
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Section 3. Congress and the several States shall have the
68
power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.
The other, introduced by Senator James L. Buckley (Conservative, R.-N.Y.), provides:
Section 1. With respect to the right to life, the word "person," as used in this Article and in the Fifth and Fourteenth Articles of Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States, applies to all human beings, including their
unborn offspring at every stage of their biological development, irrespective of age, health, function or condition of dependency.
Section 2. This Article shall not apply in an emergency
where a reasonable medical certainty exists that continuation of the pregnancy will cause the death of the mother.
Section 3. Congress and the several States shall have
power to enforce this Article by appropriate legislation
69
within their respective jurisdictions.
Each of these amendments is called by its sponsor the Human
Life Amendment. Each has several co-sponsors and has been introduced in both houses of Congress. The Hogan amendment was
introduced in the Senate by Senator Jesse Helms (R.-N.C.).
The critical question with respect to these amendments is
whether they apply from the moment of conception, that is, from
the moment when the female ovum is fertilized by the male sperm.
This is no mere academic issue, for it is increasingly clear that the
abortion of the future is likely to be abortion by pill. For example,
the interim report to shareholders of the Upjohn Company for the
quarter ended March 31, 1973 states:
In February we submitted to the U.S. Food and Drug
Administration a new Drug Application for the use of
Prostaglandin F2 alpha for the interruptionof pregnancy in
the mid-trimester. The rate of acceptance of this product in
the United Kingdom, where it was introduced last year,
has been even better than projected. Although not expected
to generate significant sales or earnings in the immediate
70
future, this product will fill an important clinical need.
The test of a constitutional amendment on abortion is whether it
H.R.J. Res. 261, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
S.J. Res. 119, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
70 Upjohn Co., Interim Report 2 (1973) (emphasis added). This report covered the three
months ending March 31, 1973.
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will prevent the licensing of abortifacient pills and devices. If they
are licensed for use at any stage of pregnancy, even the earliest, it
will be impossible to control their use at every stage. In order to
prevent the licensing and legal distribution of abortifacients, the
constitutional amendment on abortion must prohibit abortion at
every stage beginning with the moment of conception. And the
prohibition must be unequivocal.
The Hogan-Helms amendment would place the unborn child,
as far as his right to live is concerned, in the same position as if he
were simply defined as a "person" for Fourteenth Amendment purposes. He could not be deprived of his life without due process of
law. Nor could he be denied the equal protection of the laws. But
the Amendment would not prevent the state from making reasonable classifications to govern the rights of the child in the womb to
inherit, to sue for personal injuries, and in other matters where
reasonable and legitimate distinctions can be made between the
child in the womb and an older human being. Such distinctions in
varying degrees now exist in the laws of all the states, and the
Human Life Amendment would not disturb them.
In Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court mentioned in passing what
the Court called "new embryological data that purport to indicate
that conception is a 'process' over time, rather than an event. 7 1 It is
necessary for any prohibitory amendment to be so written that the
Supreme Court will have no choice but to apply it from the beginning of life, that is, from the moment of the fertilization of the
ovum. The use of the term "from the moment of conception" in the
Hogan-Helms amendment appears to be sufficient for this purpose.
If it said merely "from conception," it would be open to the argument that it implicitly adopted the Supreme Court's apparent idea
that conception is a process rather than an event. It might then be
argued that the "process" is not complete until some time later than
fertilization of the ovum and that therefore the amendment's protections should not attach until that later time. But the use of the
pinpointing "from the moment of" would seem to rebut that inference and ensure that the amendment should reasonably be applied
only to the moment of fertilization. In fact, it might even be preferable to say "from the moment of fertilization" rather than "from the
moment of conception," since it could be argued that the "moment
of conception" does not occur until the "process" of conception is
complete. In any event, the amendment should use whatever language is necessary to ensure that the Supreme Court will not misconstrue the intent of the amendment. Nor should there be any
71
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hesitation in using explicit scientific terms, including express references to the union of the sperm and ovum, if the use of such terms
will prevent misconstruction.
The Buckley amendment is less precise in its application to the
early stages of life. The Buckley amendment provides that "the
word 'person' . . . applies to all human beings, including their

unborn offspring at every stage of their biological development,
irrespective of age .

. ."

The Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade

refused to consider or resolve the question of when life begins. The
Court did not acknowledge that the child in the womb is a living
human being. It is not sufficient, therefore, for a constitutional
amendment directed against abortion to extend its protection simply
to "human beings." Some defining language is necessary to make it
clear that human life and the protection of the Constitution both
begin at the moment when the child is conceived. The Hogan-Helms
amendment's qualifier, "from the moment of conception," would
seem to answer this need more clearly than the Buckley amendment.
The commentary released by Senator Buckley's office on his
amendment said:
It is a question of biological fact as to what constitutes
"human being" and as to when "offspring" may be said to
come into existence. While the facts concerning these matters are not in dispute among informed members of the
scientific community, the ways in which these facts are to
be applied in any particular case will depend on the
specifications contained in implementing legislation passed
consistent with the standard established by the amendment. Such legislation would have to consider, in the light
of the best available scientific information, the establishment of reasonable standards for determining when a
woman is in fact pregnant, and if so, what limitations are
to be placed on the performance of certain medical procedures or the administration of certain drugs. 72
"Under the amendment," according to the Buckley commentary,
the test in each case will be a relatively simple one, i.e.,
whether an "unborn offspring" may be said to be in existence at the time when the abortion technique or medicine
is applied. Particular standards on this point are to be
73
worked out in implementing legislation.
The use of the term "unborn offspring" is ambiguous in its
72

Release from office of Sen. James L. Buckley, May 31, 1973.
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failure to specify a particular time at which one becomes an "offspring." This invites an adoption by state legislatures 6f viability or
some other post-fertilization standard to determine when one becomes an "offspring" so as to be entitled to the right to live. The
Buckley amendment does not require that offspringhood be defined
so as to begin at the moment of conception. The ambiguity of the
term "unborn offspring" is not cured by the further qualification, "at
every state of their biological development, irrespective of age,"
because for the constitutional protection to attach you must first be
an "offspring," whatever that means. Only when you have achieved
the status of offspringhood will the constitutional protection attach
"at every stage" of your "biological development" and "irrespective
of age." As the Buckley commentary on his amendment states, "the
test in each case will be a relatively simple one, i.e., whether an
'unborn offspring' may be said to be in existence at the time when
'7 4
the abortion technique or medicine is applied.
A different contrast between the Buckley and Hogan-Helms
amendments is found in their treatment of abortion where it is
claimed to be necessary to save the life of the mother. It is increasingly clear, that "abortion to save the life of the mother is apparently
scarcely more than a theoretical question in the present state of
gynecology."17 5 As one doctor has commented:
Most abortion proponents not involved in public efforts to
promote their cause, admit that elective removal of the
fetus is without psychiatric or medical justification. This is
because the fetus has not been shown to be a direct cause
of any emotional disorder, and present medical capabilities
make pregnancies safe. Almost always, other means than
abortion are available to handle any medical or psychiatric
76
indications that make an abortion mandatory.
The Hogan-Helms amendment would protect the right to live
of the child in the womb, so that he could not be killed for any
reason that would not justify the killing of his elder brother or his
grandmother. The amendment would merely apply the existing
principles of due process of law and the equal protection of the laws
to all human beings, including the child in the womb. The Supreme
Court rulings defined the child in the womb as a non-person and
deprived him of his most basic right. All the amendment would do is
give the child in the womb the same right to continue living as his
74 Id.
75 Williams, The Sacred Condominium, reprinted in J. Noonan, The Morality of Abortion 146, 162 (1970).
76 S. Nigro, A Scientific Critique of Abortion as a Medical Procedure 9 (1971).
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older brother, with both of them, of course, being governed by the
even-handed application of the principles of due process and equal
protection. In the theoretical case where the abortion is allegedly
performed to save the life of the mqther, there is a parity of values:
one life for another. Although I oppose the legalization of abortion
even there, I concede that the issue is legally debatable because of
this parity of values. Where the abortion is performed for a lesser
reason, however, such as for the physical or mental health of the
mother, or because of a defect of the child, or because the child was
conceived by rape or incest, that parity of values is no longer
present. Killing the child for any such reason can fairly be described
as killing for convenience. The basic principle is the same as that
which underlay the Nazi extermination of the Jews. It is the principle that an innocent human being can be killed if his existence is
inconvenient or uncomfortable to others or if those others consider
him unfit to live.
The Hogan-Helms amendment would not prevent the state
legislatures and the courts reviewing state laws from continuing to
regard abortion to save the life of the mother as legally justifiable
pursuant to the principles of legal necessity7 7 and self-defense (in the
case of the mother) or defense of a third party (in the case of the
doctor performing the abortion) that are applied to human beings
generally. On the other hand, it would not require such a result
and it would not require a state to allow abortions for the alleged
purpose of saving the life of the mother. The Hogan-Helms amendment would leave the door open to eventual repeal of such laws.
Incidentally, if such laws were strictly enforced, abortions would be
reduced to the vanishing point because there is no medical or
psychiatric situation in which abortion is really necessary to save the
life of the mother. As Dr. R.J. Heffernan of Tufts University stated
in a 1951 address to the Congress of the American College of
Surgeons: "Anyone who performs a therapeutic abortion (for physical disease) is either ignorant of modern methods of treating the
complications of pregnancy, or is unwilling to take time to use
them." 7 8 To regard abortion to save the life of the mother as
legitimate self-defense or defense of a third party is to indulge a
fiction, since "abortion to save the life of the mother is apparently
scarcely more than a theoretical question in the present state of
gynecology." 7 9 Also, I do not believe the unborn child should be
77 For a discussion of the doctrine of "legal necessity" as it applies to the maternal
lifesaving exception to criminal abortion, see Byrn, An American Tragedy. The Supreme
Court on Abortion, 41 Fordham L. Rev. 807, 853-54 (1973).
78 Quoted in J. Willke & J. Willke, Handbook on Abortion 37 (1971).
79 Williams, supra note 75, at 162.
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considered an aggressor so as to justify the use of such principles of
defense against him. Nor is abortion to save the life of the mother
justified by the common law doctrine of legal necessity. 80 The preferable interpretation of the Hogan-Helms amendment would not, in
my opinion, justify abortion where it is claimed to be necessary to
save the life of the mother. But Hogan-Helms would leave this issue
to resolution by the courts applying constitutional principles applicable to all human beings.
The Buckley amendment, in contrast, handles the "life of the
mother" situation explicitly. Section 2 of the Buckley amendment
has the effect of making the child in the womb a non-person "in an
emergency when a reasonable medical certainty exists that continuation of the pregnancy will cause the death of the mother." The
Buckley amendment would freeze into the Constitution the allowance of abortion where it is alleged to be necessary to save the life of
the mother. To write into the Constitution a permanent legitimization of abortion to save the life of the mother is unsound, in my
opinion, especially where that legitimization is accomplished by
denying personhood to the child in the womb in such a situation.
Since the Buckley amendment would make the child in the womb a
non-person when "continuation of the pregnancy will cause the
death of the mother," it could be argued that in such a case it would
relieve the doctor of his duty to try to save the child as well as the
mother. Possibly, he could be held to be at liberty to decide to
terminate the pregnancy by killing the child, who is defined as a
non-person, even when it would be possible to terminate the pregnancy by means that would save the child's life.
The commentary issued by Senator Buckley's office on his
amendment stated:
There is, however, an exceedingly small class of pregnancies where continuation of pregnancy will cause the death
of the woman. (The most common example is the ectopic
or tubal pregnancy.) It is our intention to exempt this
unique class of pregnancies, without opening the door to
spurious claims of risk of death. Under the amendment,
there must be (a) an emergency in which (b) reasonable
medical certainty exists that (c) continuation of pregnancy
will (d) cause the (e) death of the woman. This is designed
to cover the legitimate emergency cases, such as the ectopic
pregnancy, while closing the door to unethical physicians
80 See United States v. Holmes, 26 F. Cas. 360 (No. 15,383) (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1842);
Regina v. Dudley, 14 O.B.D. 273, 15 Cox Crim. Cas. 624 (1884). See generally F. Inbau, J.
Thompson & C. Sowle, Criminal Justice 14-15 (1968); J. Hall, General Principles of Criminal
Law 422-23 (1947).
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who in the past have been willing to sign statements attesting to risk of death when in fact none exists or when the
prospect is so remote in time or circumstance as to be
unrelated to the pregnancy.8 1
This reference to ectopic pregnancies is curious because even if
the ectopic pregnancy did not threaten the mother's life, it is doubtful that its termination could properly be considered an abortion. I
am unaware of any successful abortion prosecution, at least in
recent years, in which the removal of an ectopic pregnancy was
involved. The removal of ectopic pregnancies is not wrongful even
in Catholic teaching because it involves the direct removal of the
tube and only indirectly the death of the developing child. 82 The
removal of an ectopic pregnancy would seem to be comparable to
the removal of a cancerous uterus where the woman is pregnant. It
would seem that an adequate defense against a prosecution for
either operation could be made without the necessity of relying on a
specific constitutional or statutory allowance of abortion in cases
where it is necessary to save the life of the mother.
The Buckley amendment's formulation concerning abortion to
save the life of the mother is vulnerable also in its permanent
constitutionalization of abortion to save the life of the mother. It
would be preferable not to constitutionalize specifically such abortions and to leave the door open to eventual statutory repeal of the
laws that permit them.
It is interesting to note that the Catholic Bishops of New York
State supported the 1972 repeal of that state's permissive abortion
law although the repeal, later vetoed by Governor Rockefeller,
would have restored the pre-1970 law which permitted abortion only
to save the life of the mother.8 3 Consistent with this position, one
could fairly accept an amendment, such as the Hogan-Helms
amendment, which would permit but not require the states to allow
abortion where it is alleged to be necessary to save the life of the
mother.
Both the Hogan-Helms and the Buckley amendments contain
language directed against euthanasia as well as abortion.
Euthanasia can be either passive or active. With respect to passive
euthanasia, the law generally forbids the withholding of ordinary
treatments, although the question of whether a particular treatment
is extraordinary or ordinary must necessarily depend largely on
81 Release from office of Sen. James L. Buckley, May 31, 1973.
82 See National Conference of Catholic Bishops, Ethical and Religious Directives for
Catholic Health Facilities No. 16 (Sept. 1971).
83 See N.Y. Times, May 11, 1972, at 1, col. 1.
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medical judgment.8 4 With respect to active euthanasia, the law now
forbids active intervention to terminate life, whether it be by inject-5
ing an air bubble into the veins, by poisoning or by other means.8
Section 2 of the Hogan-Helms amendment would invalidate any
state .law which allowed or tolerated the killing of any human being
by anyone, whether public official or private party, on account of
the victim's illness, age or incapacity. The Buckley amendment
undertakes to achieve the same end by a different approach. The
Buckley amendment would not explicitly forbid euthanasia on account of illness, age or incapacity. It simply provides that "all
human beings" are "persons," "irrespective of age, health, function
or condition of dependency." While the Buckley amendment's
affirmation of personhood may be a sufficient protection, the more
.explicit Hogan-Helms formula would seem preferable.
3. Problems Presented by Passage of a ConstitutionalAmendment
a. Applicability of Amendment to Private Persons
Both the Hogan-Helms and Buckley amendments would bring
the unborn child within the category of personhood as far as his
right to life is concerned. They do not undertake to forbid private
abortions directly. Their approach instead is to extend the constitutional guarantees to the unborn child. It may be asked whether
those amendments would effectively prevent abortions committed
by private persons where no state action is present. The answer is
that the prohibitions of both the Hogan-Helms and Buckley
amendments would operate against private persons. The HoganHelms amendment, for example, would prevent all abortions for
reasons less than the preservation of the life of the mother. And it
would prevent those abortions whether performed by private parties
or public officials. Human beings in general cannot be legally killed
where it is not necessary to save the life of another. If a state or
federal law permitted the child in the womb, unlike his older
brother, to be killed by anyone (whether a private party or a public
official), where it is not necessary to save the life of another, it
would deprive the child of equal protection of the laws and of due
process of law, and would be unconstitutional under the amendment. This is clear from the following comment offered by the
Supreme Court in Wade with respect to its decision in the 1971 case
of United States v. Vuitch,8 6 which held that the Washington,

D.C., abortion statute, which permits abortion where necessary for
84 See Editorial, When Do We Let the Patient Die?, 68 Annals of Internal Medicine 695
(1968).
85 See generally C. Rice, The Vanishing Right to Live 51-72 (1969).
86 402 U.S. 62 (1971).
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the preservation of the mother's life or health, is not void for
vagueness:
[The word "person," as used in the Fourteenth Amendment, does not include the unborn. This is in accord with
the results reached in those few cases where the issue has
been squarely presented. . . . Indeed, our decision in
United States v. Vuitch . . . inferentially is to the same

effect, for we there would not have indulged in statutory
interpretation favorable to abortion in specified circumstances if the necessary consequence was the termination of
87
life entitled to Fourteenth Amendment protection.
Under the Hogan-Helms amendment, the lives of all human beings
from the moment of conception until birth would be entitled to the
same equal protection of the laws as the lives of all those persons
already born. Therefore, after the passage of this amendment the
performance of an abortion would result in the termination of a life
entitled to constitutional protection. Consequently, a state statute
permitting abortion would be unconstitutional since it would deny
the unborn child both equal protection of the laws and due process
of law. The existence of such a statute in a given jurisdiction would
thus constitute sufficient state action to prevent abortions performed
by private persons. However, in a jurisdiction where no such statute
is in existence, or where there is an unenforced restrictive abortion
statute, further considerations must be explored.
b. Effect of Amendment on Prior Strict Abortion Statutes Subsequently Repealed by Permissive Abortion Laws
It can also be argued that a constitutional amendment invalidating permissive abortion laws would restore to vitality the
previous laws in existence in every state which allowed abortion
only to save the life of the mother. We must be careful, however,
not to overstate this argument. There is no controlling precedent in
the amendments that have already been added to the Constitution.
The Sixteenth Amendment, for example, which authorized Congress
to tax incomes without apportionment among the states, was
prompted by the decision in Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust
88
Co.,

which held that the federal income tax was a direct tax and

was invalid because it was not apportioned. After the adoption of
the Sixteenth Amendment, Congress enacted new income tax provisions, and as a result a decision could not be had on the possible
revival of the earlier income tax by the adoption of the
87 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 158-59.
88 157 U.S. 429 (1895).
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amendment.89 Nor does the repeal of Prohibition by the
Twenty-first amendment shed light on the problem. By the Wilson
Act of 1890,90 Congress, pursuant to its power under Article I,
section 8 of the Constitution to regulate interstate commerce, had
authorized the states to institute Prohibition. The Twenty-first
Amendment, therefore, did not present the issue of revival of a
statute held unconstitutional prior to the adoption of the constitutional amendment. The answer to the revival question depends in
the first instance on the intent of the amendment:
A new constitution or a constitutional amendment may, of
course, expressly recognize existing statutes, or doubtless
even expressly validate statutes that have been declared
unconstitutional under the former constitution or the constitution as it stood prior to amendment. . . . The more
difficult questions arise when the new constitution or the
new constitutional provision does not expressly state
whether existing statutes are to be perpetuated, or whether
statutes invalid under the constitution prior to its amendment are revived without re-enactment by the legislature.
The cases are not harmonious in their answers to this
question, and the opinions and decisions must be examined
to make the divergences clear. 9 1
It appears that most of the decisions support the rule that,
where there is expressed no evident intent of the amendment, "the
statute should be deemed not to have been revived. '92 However,
this conclusion would not necessarily apply to the Human Life
Amendment, since the evident intent of that amendment might well
be considered to be revival of the restrictive abortion laws. If it were
held that the Human Life Amendment was intended to bar revival
of the prior laws, then of course those prior laws would not be
revived. However, if the Human Life Amendment were construed
neither to require nor to forbid revival, the issue would seem then to
depend on the intent of the state legislature at the time that it
adopted the repeal or liberalization of the 'old restrictive law. If a
state had liberalized its strict law prohibiting abortion, either before
or after Wade and Bolton, it could be argued that the complete or
partial repeal of the strict law was inextricably bound up with the
19 See Brushaber v. Union Pac. R.R., 240 U.S. 1 (1916).
90 Act of Aug. 8, 1890, ch. 728, 26 Stat. 313.
91 0. Field, The Effect of an Unconstitutional Statute 289 (1935); see State ex rel.
Stevenson v. Tufty, 20 Nev. 427, 22 P. 1054 (1890). But see Cobb v. Cohron, 26 S.W. 846
(Tex. Civ. App. 1894).
92 0. Field, supra note 91, at 293.
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accompanying enactment of the permissive provisions which the
Human Life Amendment would invalidate. The Human Life
Amendment, in invalidating the permissive law, would thus implicitly invalidate the repeal of the strict law. The old strict law
would therefore be revived by the adoption of the Human Life
Amendment.
A leading case in support of this interpretation is Selective Life
Insurance Co. v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United
States, 93 in which the Arizona Supreme Court said: "Where the
clause containing the repeal is incidental to the rest of the statute,
and the latter is invalid, the clause containing the repeal will
likewise be deemed invalid, leaving the prior law in full force and
effect."'94 There would appear to be no reason why the result would
be different where the invalidity of the permissive laws is caused by
a constitutional amendment which operates prospectively, as distinguished from a judicial decision which operates retrospectively. This
is so because the obvious intent in repealing strict abortion laws was
to replace them with valid permissive laws, and the intent to repeal
would arguably be conditional on the continued validity of those
permissive laws. 95 This argument, of course, is necessarily a tentative one, since its validity would depend in each state on the legislative intent involved in the enactment of permissive abortion in that
state, and upon the position of the courts of that state on the general
issue of whether invalidation of a repealing statute revives the
statute which was repealed.
It could be that the legislature intended the repeal of the strict
law to be severable from the liberalized provisions that were enacted
with it. In such a case, the invalidation of the liberalized provisions
by the Human Life Amendment would not invalidate the repeal of
the restrictive law and would therefore not revive the restrictive
law. 9 6 However, in the adoption of the Human Life Amendment the
Congress and state legislatures could express a definite intent on this
point which would of course be controlling, because of the supremacy of the federal constitutional amendment, regardless of the
ordinary posture of the state law on the point.
c. Potential State Defiance of a Constitutional Amendment: The
Applicability of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments
It is possible, of course, to imagine a situation in which a state
will simply defy the constitutional amendment forbidding abortion
93 101 Ariz. 594, 422 P.2d 710 (1967).

94 Id. at 601, 422 P.2d at 717.
95 See Faubus v. Kinney, 239 Ark. 443, 449, 389 S.W.2d 887, 891 (1965).
96 See 0. Field, supra note 91, at 283-86; Annot., 102 A.L.R. 802 (1936).
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and will adopt or continue to maintain a permissive law or simply
repeal all its provisions relating to abortion. It does not seem,
however, that this possibility presents a real problem. In fact, it is
the same conjecture that was raised concerning the legislative reapportionment decisions of the Supreme Court. 9 7 In this latter situation, the conjectures and fears were dissipated by the general willingness of the American people to -abide by the rule of law. However, in the event that a state did so defy the Human Life Amendment, it could be argued that the failure of the state to punish the
killing of human beings in the womb, who would be protected as
persons by the Human Life Amendment, would constitute a denial
of the equal protection of the laws in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Since state action is necessary to find a violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the state action in this case would have to
be found in the inaction of the state in failing to enforce its general
laws against homicide in protection of the unborn child. In Catlette
v. United States,98 the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held
that there was a violation of a statute punishing deprivations of civil
rights "under color of any law" where a police officer ignored his
duty to protect a group of Jehovah's Witnesses and allowed the
Witnesses to be assaulted by a mob. 99 The court said:
It is true that a denial of equal protection has hitherto been
largely confined to affirmative acts of discrimination. The
Supreme Court, however, has already taken the position
that culpable official State inaction may also constitute a
denial of equal protection.10 0
Likewise, in Picking v. Pennsylvania R.R., 10 1 the Third Circuit found a violation of a federal statute providing civil liability for
deprivations of civil rights under color of law1 0 2 where a justice of
the peace refused to perform his duty to grant a hearing before the
plaintiffs were extradited from the state. The court said:
As to the defendant Keiffer, the complainant alleges
that he was a justice of the peace and that he denied and
refused a hearing to the plaintiffs upon their arrest on
August 15, 1941. If these allegations be proved it may be
concluded that the refusal of Keiffer to act as required by
law may have deprived the plaintiffs of their liberty with97 See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).

98 132 F.2d 902 (4th Cir. 1943).
99 The statute in question was the predecessor of the current 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1970),
100 132 F.2d at 907. See also State ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938).
101 151 F.2d 240 (3d Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 776 (1947).
102 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
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out due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment.... The refusal of a state officer to perform a
duty imposed on him by the law of his state because he has
conspired with others in a conscious design to deprive a
person of civil rights in legal effect may be the equivalent
10 3
of action taken "under the color" of the law of the state.
The court in Picking seemed to require that the official's inaction be pursuant to a conspiracy before that inaction could become
state action. Moreover, the Supreme Court precedents bear out the
conclusion of Justice Brennan, in his separate opinion in Adickes v.
Kress & Co.,10 4 that "[o]ur cases have never explicitly held that
state inaction alone in the face of purely private discrimination
constitutes a denial of equal protection.' 1 5 Nevertheless, the argument that equal protection can be denied by state inaction has not
been without support in the Supreme Court. In their separate opinion in Bell v. Maryland,10 6 Justice Goldberg, Chief Justice Warren
and Justice Douglas, in quoting with approval the view expressed in
correspondence by Mr. Justice Bradley, who wrote the opinion for
the Court in the Civil Rights Cases of 1883,107 stated:
"Denying includes inaction as well as action. And denying
the equal protection of the laws includes the omission to
protect, as well as the omission to pass laws for protection." These views are fully consonant with this Court's
recognition that state conduct which might be described as
"inaction" can nevertheless constitute responsible "state action"
within
the
meaning
of the
Fourteenth
Amendment.10 8
If a case were clearly presented of a police officer who stood by
and refused to attempt to stop a lynch mob from killing its victim, it
would be difficult to imagine the Supreme Court holding otherwise
than that the officer's refusal to perform his duty to protect life is
state action in denial of equal protection of the laws. 10 9 If the state
officer who refused to act were a prosecutor whose inaction occurred
after rather than during the crime, it would seem no less fair to find
that his inaction constitutes culpable state action. While such a
151 F.2d at 250.
398 U.S. 144 (1970).
1os Id. at 230.
106 378 U.S. 226 (1964).
107 Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
108 378 U.S. at 309-11.
109 See Peters, Civil Rights and State Non-Action, 34 Notre Dame Law. 303 (1959);
Abernathy, Expansion of the State Action Concept Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 43
Cornell L.Q. 375 (1958).
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finding might present difficult problems of interfering with prosecutorial discretion, a systematic refusal to prosecute for a particular crime would arguably raise the commission of that crime to the
level of a custom or usage with the force of law. Thus, in Adickes v.
Kress & Co., 110 the Supreme Court said:
Congress included customs and usages within its
definition of law in § 1983 because of the persistent and
widespread discriminatory practices of state officials in
some areas of the post-bellum South. As Representative
Garfield said: "[E]ven where the laws are just and equal on
their face, yet, by a systematic maladministration of them,
or a neglect or refusal to enforce their provisions, a portion
of the people are denied equal protection under them."
Although not authorized by written law, such practices of
state officials could well be so permanent and well settled
as to constitute a "custom or usage" with the force of law.
This interpretation of custom recognizes that settled
practices of state officials may, by imposing sanctions or
withholding benefits, transform private predilections into
compulsory rules of behavior no less than legislative
pronouncements. I"'
The application of these concepts to abortion is readily apparent. If a state law punishes as homicide the intentional, unjustified
killing of persons, and if the state authorities adopt a policy of not
prosecuting for the killing of unborn persons while prosecuting for
the killing of all other classes of persons, it is fair to say that such
official inaction denies the child in the womb the equal protection of
the laws. The systematic refusal to prosecute abortionists is no less a
denial of equal protection than the systematic refusal to prosecute
members of lynch mobs. There is a denial of equal protection
whether or not the prosecutor is actively in conspiracy with the
lynch mob or the abortionist. Some problems are presented by this
analysis, however. If the state homicide law were not originally
intended by the legislature to apply to abortion, the duty to prosecute under that law would depend on construing the legislative
intent to apply the homicide law to human persons generally. Since
the child in the womb would not be clearly recognized as a person
until the passage of the Human Life Amendment, it could be argued
that his newly-conferred status of personhood would entitle him to
the protection of the homicide law pursuant to the general legislative
intent to extend that protection to all human persons.
'O 398 U. S. 144 (1970):
Id. at 167-68.

"'
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Another problem that would arise in the enforcement of the
Human Life Amendment is that of standing to sue. If a state refused
to enact or enforce a law prohibiting abortions, a class action
brought by a guardian ad litem on behalf of unborn children would
seem to be the appropriate remedy to compel the prosecutor to cease
and desist from discriminatory enforcement of the homicide law. In
S. v. D., n2 the Supreme Court held that the mother of an illegitimate child had no standing to sue to compel the prosecutor to
prosecute the father who refused to support the child. The Texas
statute subjected to criminal penalties any "parent" who refuses to
support his or her child, but the Texas authorities had construed the
statute to apply only to parents of legitimate children. The Court
held that the mother had failed to show that "her failure to secure
support payments results from the nonenforcement, as to her child's
father," of the criminal statute.1 1 3 The statute was not a civil
contempt .type of provision, wherein the father could secure release
from jail on payment of support to the child.
On the contrary, the statute creates a completed offense
with a fixed penalty as soon as a parent fails to support his
child. Thus, if appellant were granted the requested relief,
it would result only in the jailing of the child's father. The
prospect that prosecution will, at least in the future, result
in payment of support can, at best, be termed only speculative. Certainly the "direct"relationshipbetween the alleged
injury and the claim sought to be adjudicated, which previous decisions of this Court suggest is a prerequisite of
11 4
standing, is absent in this case.
The Court went on to describe the general lack of standing of a
person to contest the policies of prosecutors:
The Court's prior decisions consistently hold that a
citizen lacks standing to contest the policies of the prosecuting authority when he himself is neither prosecuted nor
threatened with prosecution. See Younger v. Harris, 401
U.S. 37, 42 . . . (1971); Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U.S. 31,
33 . . . (1962); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 501 . . .

(1961). Although these cases arose in a somewhat different
context, they demonstrate that, in American jurisprudence
at least, a private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of another.
Appellant does have an interest in the support of her child.
112
113
114

411 U.S. 614 (1973).
Id. at 618.
Id.
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But given the special status of criminal prosecutions in our
system, we hold that appellant has made an insufficient
showing of a direct nexus between the vindication of her
interest15 and the enforcement of the State's criminal
1

laws.

The three cases cited by the Court in this connection, however,
do not control in the abortion situation. In Younger v. Harris,116 the
plaintiff had himself been indicted in a state court and sought
unsuccessfully to get a federal court injunction against the prosecution on the ground that the prosecution violated his constitutional
rights. The unborn child would not be seeking to prevent a prosecution of himself, but would seek instead to prevent official tolerance
of his killing by the failure of the state to prosecute abortionists.
Bailey v. Patterson'1 7 involved efforts by Negroes to enjoin prosecutions of others under Mississippi breach-of-the-peace statutes. They
were denied standing because they themselves were not threatened
with prosecution. The unborn child would not seek to enjoin the
prosecution of others but rather would seek to require the prosecution of abortionists on the ground that such prosecutions are essential to the protection of the unborn child's right to live. In Poe v.
Ullman, 18 plaintiffs alleged that the existence of Connecticut's law
restricting the use of contraceptives inhibited them through fear of
prosecution and thereby violated their rights. The Court held they
lacked standing because there was no justiciable controversy since
there was no showing that enforcement of the statute against plaintiffs was threatened or even contemplated. The unborn child, of
course, is in a different position. He does not argue that his conduct
is inhibited for fear of prosecution. On the contrary, he alleges that
the refusal to prosecute abortionists deprives him of the equal protection of the laws. There would seem to be a sufficient nexus
between the relief sought, i.e., the prosecution of abortionists, and
the protection of the life of the unborn child, so as to satisfy the
criteria for standing established by the Supreme Court.1 19
It might also be argued, once the right of the unborn child to
the protection of the Constitution is established, that permissive
abortion inflicts upon him a badge of servitude in violation of the
Thirteenth Amendment.' 20 Although the Thirteenth Amendment
Id. at 619.
401 U.S. 37 (1971).
117 369 U.S. 31 (1962).
1Is 367 U.S. 497 (1961).
119See S.v. D., 411 U.S. 614 (1973).
120 U.S. Const. amend. 13 provides:
Section 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for
1'

116
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was originally directed against the institution of Negro slavery, 12it1
has expanded beyond that purpose. In Hodges v. United States
the Supreme Court stated that the Thirteenth Amendment is "not a
declaration in favor of a particular people. It reaches every race and
every individual, and if in any respect it commits one race to [the
care of] the Nation it commits every race and every individual
thereof."1 2 2 On repeated occasions, the Court has invalidated peonage statutes which made it a crime to refuse to perform a contract of
employment on the grounds that the statutes violated the Thirteenth
Amendment. 12 3 There is no inherent reason why the concept of
badges of servitude should be narrowly construed to embrace only
racial discriminations. As one writer commented upon the 1968 case
of Jones v. Mayer, 124 which held that the 1866 Civil Rights Act,
enacted pursuant to the Thirteenth Amendment, forbade private
housing discrimination:
The Court, by emphasizing the self-executing nature of the
Thirteenth Amendment, is in a position to define basic
rights which no one might constitutionally violate. If the
Thirteenth Amendment, which prohibits second class citizenship, is read to apply to the characteristics of that type
of citizenship now held by black Americans, then an
affirmative duty could be imposed on all branches of the
Government forbidding second class citizenship. By now it
is clear that the Thirteenth Amendment applies not only to
Black Americans. It is true that it was passed to establish
freedom for Negro slaves, but reading Jones it appears that
it was not so much the fact that plaintiffs were black that
gave rise to the badges of slavery argument, but discrimination itself was held to be the badge of slavery which
results in second class citizenship to any minority. It is thus
clear that all who suffer from the incidents of second class
citizenship are covered by the Thirteenth Amendment.
Badges and incidents of slavery are not solely relics of
slavery (if so interpreted, of course, it could apply only to
former slaves) but it applies to characteristics of slavery in
crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United
States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.
Section 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate
legislation.
121

203 U.S. 1 (1906).

122 Id. at 16-17.
123

Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4 (1944); Taylor v. Georgia, 315 U.S. 25 (1942); United

States v. Reynolds, 235 U.S. 133 (1914); Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219 (1911); Peonage
Cases, 123 F. 671 (M.D. Ala. 1903).
124 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
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general; so a victim people need not have been enslaved
in
125
order to invoke Thirteenth Amendment protections.
It is not unreasonable to conclude that unborn children are
subjected to a badge of servitude when they as a class, unlike all
other human beings, are made subject to death at the convenience of
others or because those others consider them unfit to live. In Yick
Wo v. Hopkins, 126 the Supreme Court held that the discriminatory
operation against Chinese laundries of a local building ordinance
denied the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court emphasized that it is of the essence
of slavery to hold one's life or livelihood at the mere will of another:
For, the very idea that one man may be compelled to hold
his life, or the means of living, or any material right
essential to the enjoyment of life, at the mere will of
another, seems to be intolerable in any country where
127
freedom prevails, as being the essence of slavery itself.
The prohibitions- of the Thirteenth Amendment extend to private persons, whether or not state action is involved.1 28 If permissive abortion inflicts a badge of servitude on the unborn child,
federal courts would have jurisdiction to prosecute private129persons
as well as public officials under federal civil rights acts.
4. A Proposed Amendment
It should not be supposed that any particular form of amendment is sacrosanct. While the Hogan-Helms amendment, in my
opinion, is adequate to solve the problem, that amendment was not
written on tablets of stone on Mount Sinai. It is possible to suggest
alternatives that would do the job. Any alternative, however, must
be prohibitory rather than permissive, and it must apply from the
beginning of life. Once there is agreement on these points, it should
be fairly easy to agree on specific language. For example, it would
be possible to substitute a direct prohibition of private abortion for
the indirect prohibitions embodied in both the Hogan-Helms and
Buckley amendments. The following language would outlaw all
abortions, both public and private, except for such cases as the
ectopic pregnancy and the cancerous uterus where the mother's life
125 Comment, Constitutional Law: Badges and Indices of Slavery Prohibited Under the
1866 Civil Rights Act, 17 Loyola L. Rev. 79, 103 (1970).
126 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
127 Id. at 370.
128 See Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971).
129 See id.; 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1970); 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1970).
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is threatened and the operation, e.g., to remove the cancerous
uterus, is independently justified to save her life, with the death of
the unborn child permitted as an unintended effect of that operation. The amendment would also preserve concurrent jurisdiction in
Congress and the states over the subject:
1. Abortion is hereby prohibited within the United States
and all territory subject to the jurisdiction thereof. As used
in this article, abortion means the intentional destruction of
unborn human life, which life begins at the moment of
fertilization. 2. Congress and the several States shall have
concurrent power to enforce this article by appropriate
legislation.
Other possibilities might readily be suggested. But whatever the
form of the amendment, so long as it is adequate to overrule the
Wade and Bolton decisions, it should be supported with particular
urgency by all those who value the right to live of all human beings.
For this is no mere academic dispute. Rather, it is an issue of life or
death. It might be helpful in this context to recall the words of Dr.
Joseph De Lee of the University of Chicago, who in 1940 emphasized the importance of protecting the innocent life in the womb:
All doctors (except abortionists) feel that the principles of
the sanctity of human life, held since the time of the
ancient Jews and Hippocrates and stubbornly defended by
the Catholic Church, are correct. And we are pained when
placed before the necessity of sacrificing it. At the present
time, when rivers of blood and tears of innocent men,
women and children are flowing in most parts of the
world, it seems silly to be contending over the right to live
of an unknowable atom of human flesh in the uterus of a
woman. No, it is not silly. On the contrary, it is of transcendent importance that there be in this chaotic world one
high spot, however small, which is against the deluge of
immorality that is sweeping over us. That we the medical
profession hold to the principle of the sacredness of human
life and of the right of the individual even though unborn
is proof that humanity is not yet lost and that we may
130
ultimately obtain salvation.
130 J. De Lee, Yearbook of Obstetrics and Gynecology 69 (1940). See also address by Dr.
H. Ratner (Abortion: A Public Health Viewpoint), Illinois State Medical Society Symposium
on Abortion, March 15, 1967.
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